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Abstract: Assets are interrelated in risk analysis methodologies for information systems promoted by international stan-
dards. This means that an attack on one asset can be propagated through the network and threaten an organi-
zation's most valuable assets. It is necessary to valuate all assets, the direct and indirect asset dependencies, 
as well as the probability of threats and the resulting asset degradation. These methodologies do not, however, 
consider uncertain valuations and use precise values on different scales, usually percentages. Linguistic terms 
are used by the experts to represent assets values, dependencies and frequency and asset degradation associ-
ated with possible threats. Computations are based on the trapezoidal fuzzy numbers associated with these 
linguistic terms. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Information Systems (IS) are composed of a set of 
data management elements designed to provide ser-
vices and benefits in areas as far a part as public ad-
ministration, industrial control, the banking or geo-
graphical and weather information. 
Technological developments and the universal in-
ternet access has led to an increase in system vulner-
abilities. Therefore, ISs have to be analysed with a 
view to risk minimization by means of well-planned 
actions to protect information, processes and services 
from possible threats. Threats range from act of ter-
rorism, industrial espionage, etc., or even a simple un-
intentional human error by an operator. 
Standards promoted by the International Organi-
zation for Standardization [ISO/IEC](2005, 2011) on 
IS security suggest three-stage risk analysis and man-
agement methodologies. 
The planning stage establishes the necessary 
points for starting up the project, defines objectives, 
and identifies participants and competencies. The 
analysis stage identifies the IS assets, as well as their 
relations (dependencies), the threats to which they are 
exposed and their frequency and asset degradation 
levels. Finally, the risk management stage determines 
the safeguards and strategies that reduce impact and 
risk. 
In this paper, we focus on the second stage, anal-
ysis. Assets are the IS or related resources, necessary 
for an organization's correct operation and for achiev-
ing the goals set by its manager. Assets can be data, 
applications, software, facilities, hardware, services... 
The asset dependencies are usually represented in 
terms of percentages, signalling how likely the failure 
of an asset is to affect another. 
Often only a few elements {terminal assets), usu-
ally data or services, account for the total value of 
an organization's assets. The value of these assets is 
transferred to other assets through the established de-
pendency relations. Thus, non-terminal assets have 
no intrinsic values; they accumulate their value from 
terminal assets. 
However, the methodologies based on interna-
tional standards, such us (Lopez Crespo, Amutio-
Gomez, Candau and Manas, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c), 
MEHARI [CSIF](2010), CRAMM [CCTA](2003), 
OCTAVE-S (Alberts and Dorofee, 2005) or NIST 
800-30 (Stoneburner and Gougen, 2002), obviate the 
difficulty of correctly assigning asset dependencies, 
as well as terminal asset values or the impact on the 
entire system caused by the materialization of a threat 
to an asset. Moreover, these methodologies do not 
consider uncertainty concerning these assessments. 
In this paper we propose a fuzzy risk analysis in 
IS as a solution to these deficiencies. 
Section 2 reviews some operations on trapezoidal 
fuzzy numbers and introduces a fuzzy evaluation of 
asset dependencies. Section 3 provides a fuzzy five-
component valuation of assets on the basis of five 
components is provided. Threats and asset risk im-
pact indicators are described in Section 4. In Section 
5, we introduce the similarity function used to asso-
ciate a linguistic term from a set with a trapezoidal 
fuzzy numbers. Finally, some conclusions and future 
research are discussed in Section 6. 
2 FUZZY VALUATION OF 
DEPENDENCIES 
We use the following arithmetic for fuzzy numbers 
proposed in (Xu, Shang, Qian and Shul, 2010): If 
Ai = (ai, bi, ci, d\) and A2 = (a2, b2, c2, d2), then 
A\®A2 = (ai + a2 - aia2, bi + fo - bifo, 
£i + c2 - cic2, d\ + d2 - d\d2), 
Ai®A2 = {ava2,bvb2,cvc2,dvd2). 
As mentioned above, the assets in IS are con-
nected by dependency relationships, and a failure of 
one asset may affect other assets. Asset Aj depends on 
the asset At (or At influences Aj), denoted by (At, Aj) 
(graphically At —> Aj), if a failure in asset At causes a 
failure in the asset Aj with any given probability. This 
probability is usually referred to as the degree of de-
pendency of Aj with respect to At or the influence of 
At over Aj, which we denote it by dd(At, Aj). 
Proposed IS risk analysis methodologies 
(MAGERIT, MEHARI, OCTAVE...) assign just 
a percentage to indicate the degree of dependency 
between two assets, and sometimes even propose 
the use of a Boolean value indicating whether or 
not this dependency exists regardless of the degree 
of dependency. We propose the use of trapezoidal 
fuzzy numbers to represent these dependencies. 
Consequently, the experts can build a linguistic term 
set to intuitively define the dependency between two 
assets under uncertainty. 
Our aim then is to compute the indirect asset de-
pendencies since assets values are accumulated from 
terminal assets through these dependencies. 
The degree of dependency of asset Ak with respect 
to Aj, DD(Ai, Ak), is computed as follows1. We denote 
by P={Pi,..., Ps} the set of paths in the analysis of the 
influence of At over Ak. Then, 
A) If all assets (excluding At and Ak) in the paths in 
P are influenced by only one asset, then 
DD{A^Ak) = © DD{A~Ak\Pj), (1) 
7=1 
1
 To avoid ambiguity, we will write "DD" to refer to total 
dependency between two assets separated by other interme-
diate assets, and "dd" when they are directly connected. 
where DD{AhAk\Pj) = dd(AhAJX) <g> 
dd{Aji,Aj2)®...®dd{AJn,Ak), and Pj : (At ->• 
Afl-tAfl-t.-.-tAjn-tAt). 
B) Otherwise, we assume that the first r paths in P 
are formed by assets (excluding At and Ak) influ-
enced by only one asset, and the remaining s— r 
paths include at least one asset influenced by two 
or more assets. Then, for the r first paths, we pro-
ceed as in A), and we denote by S the set including 
the s - r remaining paths. We proceed with S as 
follows: 
(i) Compute the set of non-terminal assets in S 
influenced by two or more assets, denoted by 
I, and the subset of / including assets uninflu-
enced by any other asset in I, denoted by NI. 
(ii) We consider an asset Ar in NI. Then, we sim-
plify the paths in S that include asset Ar mak-
ing Ai ->• Ar ->• ... ->• Ak, with dd(AhAr) = 
DD{Ah Ar) (computed as in A)). 
(iii) Remove repeated paths from S and keep only 
one instance, 
(iv) Build / and NI again from S. 
(v) If NI is not empty, go to (ii). Otherwise, the 
algorithm finishes. 
Let us denote the resulting set of paths by S= 
{Pv..., Pm}, with m< s— r. Then, the degree of 
dependency of Ak regarding At is 
DD{A^Ak) = © DD{A~Ak\Pj) e DU^Ak\Pj). 
(2) 
Note that transactions between trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers representing linguistic terms from a set in 
[0,1] will remain in [0,1], and the results of these op-
erations can be translated into one of the linguistic 
terms of the set by means of a similarity function. 
Furthermore, the operation © is consistent with the 
methodologies established for risk analysis and man-
agement in IS, allowing performances in probabilistic 
terms. 
3 FUZZY VALUATION OF 
ASSETS 
MAGERIT defines the value of an asset as the losses 
that would be sustained if the respective asset is no 
longer available. These can be losses of money, user 
confidence, the organizational prestige... Assets are 
usually evaluated taking into account the following 
five components (Lopez Crespo et al., 2006a, 2006b, 
2006c): 
• Confidentiality. How much damage would it 
cause if the asset is disclosed to someone it should 
not be? This is a typical data inspection. 
• Integrity. How much damage would it cause if the 
asset is damaged or corrupt? This is a typical data 
inspection. Data can be manipulated, be wholly 
or partially false, or even missing. 
• Authenticity. How much damage would it cause if 
we do not exactly know who has done what? This 
is a typical services (user authentication) and data 
(authenticity of the person accessing data to write 
or read) inspection. 
• Traceability How much damage would it cause 
if it is not known for whom the service is being 
provided?, i.e. who does what and when? How 
much damage would it cause if it is not known 
who accessed what data and what they did with 
them? 
• Availability. How much damage would it cause if 
the asset is not available or cannot be used? This 
is a typical services inspection. 
Only the terminal assets have an associated value 
for the above components. The other assets accumu-
late value from terminal assets on the basis of depen-
dency relationships. We again use the set of linguistic 
terms that represent trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to rep-
resent uncertainty when valuating the terminal assets. 
Let us denote assets by vj = 
(^(1)^(2)^(3)^(4)^(5))' W h e r e % i S a l i n " 
guistic term assigned by an expert for the Ah value 
component in asset Aj. If we denote by TAS the 
terminal asset set, then the value of asset Aj with 
respect to terminal assets is: 
4 THREATS 
Next, we assess threats and estimate indicators of the 
impact on and risk to assets. A threat is an event that 
can trigger an incident in our organization, causing 
damage or intangible material loss to the assets, and 
an attack is any deliberate action aimed at violating 
the IS security mechanisms. MAGERIT suggests two 
threat assessment measures: degradation, the damage 
that the threat can cause to the asset, and frequency, 
how often the threat materializes. 
We will again use fuzzy linguistic terms rather 
than percentages and probabilities to represent degra-
dation and frequency. A threat is a vector u = (D, f) 
whose components are degradation and frequency. 
Note that the degradation has to be established for 
each the the five asset components described in the 
previous section, 
-3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
D = (di,d2,d3,d4,d5), 
i.e., the threat causes a degradation dt in the Ah com-
ponent of the asset. 
Let us consider a threat on the asset Aj. When the 
threat is realized, each component is affected by the 
expression 
\=di®Vj{i), (3) 
where Ij,, is the impact on the Ah component of the 
attacked asset (Aj). 
We use Eq. (4) below to compute the risk to the 
attacked asset _ _ _ 
RJ(l)=iJ(l)®f- (4) 
After computing the impact caused by a materi-
alized threat on an asset, we can compute the impact 
transmitted from the attacked asset to its dependent 
assets. If Aj is the asset on which the threat has mate-
rialized and the degree of dependency of Aj with re-
spect to Ak is DD{Ak, Aj), then the attack on asset Aj 
has an impact on Ak of Ik,, = DD{Ak, Aj) (g> dt <g> vj,,. 
Thus, the risk to asset Ak is 
% = 4 , ®f= DD(Ak, Aj) ®di® vJ(l) <8> f (5) 
5 SIMILARITY FUNCTION 
A similarity function is required to associate the re-
sulting trapezoidal fuzzy number with an element in 
the linguistic term set. This function can also be used 
at any step of the methodology to derive the linguistic 
terms associated with the respective trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers output to represent dependencies, accumu-
lated values... 
Several authors have proposed different similarity 
functions, which are based on the centroid of a fuzzy 
number and the distance between the components of 
the fuzzy numbers, see (Lee, 1999; Chen and Chen 
2001, 2007). Finally, a more recent similarity func-
tion was proposed in (Xu et al., 2010) and compared 
with the proposal reported in (Chen and Chen, 2007). 
We use the function proposed in Vicente, Mateos 
and Jimenez (2012), which considers another param-
eter consisting of the ratio between the common area 
and the joint area under the membership functions of 
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. Moreover, we use the dis-
tance 7co between centroids since the use of distances 
with non-rectangular spheres is inconsistent with the 
intuitive perception of similarity. 
Given A and B, the similarity function can be de-
fined as 
***> = ' - i f 1 - i fe^i) -« S V-
-^fc^-^i.Pj.FjMA-j.rj)], 
where wi + w-5 + w-5 = 1, (Xj, Yj) and (Ag, Yg) are the 
centroids of A and B, respectively, i.e. 
XA = Yj(a3 + a2) + (1 - YA){aA + a,) and 
^ 2, if 34 — a\ = 0 
/fy is the membership function of %, 
and 
£°((*i,/i), (^2,72)) = /naf{| jri - Jr2 I, I 71 -72 |} . 
Note that w\, w2 and w-5 represent the relative im-
portance of the three elements considered in the sim-
ilarity function. Analysts will assign the values that 
best fits their own model. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
We have developed a fuzzy risk analysis model for 
information systems that conforms to international 
standards, particularly the MAGERIT methodology. 
The model is an improvement on this and other exist-
ing methodologies since it includes uncertainty about 
the assessments by means of linguistic terms, which 
have associated trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. The pro-
posed methodology makes computations on the basis 
of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to accumulate depen-
dencies between assets and asset valuations and to 
determine impacts and risk from the threat degrada-
tion and frequency, respectively. Moreover, similarity 
functions can be used at any step in the methodology 
to derive a linguistic term for the trapezoidal fuzzy 
number output. 
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